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Cherry: Johnson Controls, Inc.

UNITED AUTO WORKERS v. JOHNSON
CONTROLS, INC.: ONE SMALL
STEP FOR WOMANKIND
The ability to conceive and bear children is both a blessing and a curse. Too
often, women's childbearing capacity has been used against them. Nowhere is this
fact more apparent than in the employment arena. The curse on childbearers in the
workforce has taken many forms, from lower overall earnings to "glass ceiling"
limitations.1 These phenomena appear to result from the fact that women can and
the workforce for a
do have children, which necessitates their being absent from
2
be.
may
period
that
long
or
short
however
time,
of
period
In UnitedAuto Workers v. Johnson Controls,Inc.,3 the U.S. Supreme Court
was faced with the task of deciding whether women's childbearing capacity could
be used to limit women's job choices and opportunities within certain industrial/
manufacturing fields.4 The Court decided that the ability to bear children could be
used to so limit women, but only if the employer met a high standard. 5 In Johnson
Controls, employees who worked in a toxic work environment sought a determination that their employer's fetal protection policy discriminated on the basis of sex in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.6 The Court so held and ruled that the gender-based policy
violated the amended Title VII and indicated that employers must establish a Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification for such gender-based policies to survive constitu7
tional muster in the future.
This Casenote will explore the history leading up to the decision and the
effects of this decision on employment practice jurisprudence in the future.
BACKGROUND
Fetal protection policies are employer-created policies designed to protect
'See generallyR. K.CwmR, MEN AND Wowai

op Ta Coi'oRATtoN (1977) for a discussion of the various forms
of sex discrimination facing women in the workforce. See also Becker, BarriersFacingWomen in the Wage
LaborMarket and theNeedforAdditionalRemedies: A Reply toFischelandLagear,53 U. Cta. L. REv. 934,

940-47.
2See House Comm. on Education and Labor, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, H. REP No. 948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & A.D. News (92 Stat.) 4749,4751 for the proposition

that women's lower wages are due to their lower lifetime participation in the labor force due to the fact that
women are the childbearers and primary caretakers of families in our society.
3 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
4 Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1204.
6
1d. at 1199-1202.
1d.at 1204.
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employees' unbom fetuses from harm caused by the mothers' exposure to hazardous
materials, such as toxic chemicals, while on the job.' Some fetal protection policies
are so highly restrictive that women are absolutely forbidden to work at certain jobs. 9
The number of these highly restrictive policies has been increasing since the
1970's.' 0
Since these policies typically refer to and affect only female employees,
women view them as discriminatory and have litigated fetal protection policies as
violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA)." Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to
dismiss or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's
sex.'2 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 provides that discrimination on
or related medical conditions" constitutes sex disthe basis of "pregnancy, childbirth
13
crimination under Title VII.
Basically, there are two types of Title VII cases: disparate treatment and
disparate impact.14 When an employer treats an employee less favorably because of
that employee's gender, a disparate treatment analysis applies.' 5 Two types of
disparate treatment cases can be found: facial and pretextual.16 "Facial discrimination occurs when an employer adopts a policy that treats some employees differently
from others on the basis of sex."'1 7 The sole defense where facial discrimination is
involved is the existence of a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).' 8 A
BFOQ arises where classification by sex is "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business."'19 Pretextual discrimination occurs when an
employer adopts a facially neutral practice which classifies employees on a basis that
Title VII permits.20 In a pretextual discrimination case, the employee claims the
employer is using the facially neutral practice as a shield or a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.2 '

' Moelis, Fetal Protectionand PotentialLiability: JudicialApplication of the PregnancyDiscrimination
No. 3 369, 369 (1985).
Act and the DisparateImpact Theory, 11 Am. J. FAM. L. & MNED.
9Id.
6

' Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal VulnerabilityPolicies,53 U. CuI. L. REv. 1219,1225-26 (1986).
"Note, Fetal ProtectionPolicies: FurtheringSex Discriminationin the Market Place, 28 J. FAm. L. 727,
727 (1990).
1242 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
1342 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (1988).
'4 Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
5 Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 711 (D.D.C. 1981).
16Note, supra note 11, at 732.
17Id.

"S42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) (1988).
191d.
2

0Moelis, supra note 8, at 372. See also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253
(1980) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).
21 Id.
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PDA cases are typically analyzed utilizing the disparate impact theory. 22 A
disparate impact exists when an employer's policy is facially neutral but has a
2
disproportionately adverse effect on a class of persons protected under Title VII. 1
The defense used to combat an allegation of disparate impact is business necessity.?
In prior fetal protection policy cases, the business necessity defense has involved a
three step inquiry: "(1) whether there is a substantial health risk to the fetus; (2)
whether transmission of the hazard to the fetus occurs only through women; and (3)
alternative equally capable of preventing the
whether there is a less discriminatory
25
health hazard to the fetus.
Three federal circuit courts of appeals' decisions concerning fetal policies
created the necessity for a U.S. Supreme Court determination on the issue. 26 In
Wright v. Olin Corp.,27 the employer implemented a fetalprotection policy to protect
fetuses of pregnant employees from the damaging effects of toxic chemicals used
during manufacturing at its facilities. 28 Olin's policy involved the institution of
three job classifications in accordance with the level of exposure to hazardous substances.2 9 In examining whether this policy was discriminatory, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that the disparate impact/business necessity approach30
was the best theory to use when reviewing a fetal protection policy underTitle VII.
The court held that Olin's policy presented aprimafaciecase of discrimination in
violation of Title VII. 1 However, the court also found that Olin effectively
restrictions were reasonably
presented a business necessity defense in that such
32
required to protect the health of unborn children.
In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp.,3 3 the defendant hospital hired Sylvia
Hayes to work in its radiology department.?' Two months later the hospital fired Ms.
Hayes when she informed her supervisor that she was pregnant. 35 The hospital's
policy required that pregnant x-ray technicians be removed from their positions
22Moelis, supra note 8, at 373.
2 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
2 Johnson Controls, 111 S.Ct. at 1200-01 (citing International Union v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871,

885 (7th Cir. 1989)).
26 Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543

(1 lth Cir. 1984); International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
27697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
2 Id. at 1182.
29Id. The job classifications were as follows: (1) restricted jobs which may require contact with and
exposure to suspected teratrogenic agents; (2) controlled jobs which may require very limited contact with
harmful chemicals; (3) unrestricted jobs which do not present a hazard to the pregnant female or fetus. Id.
30
Id. at 1186.
11Id. at 1189.
32
d. The safety of unborn children was analogized by the court to the safety of customers of the business,
the children being considered business invitees or licensees for which an employer has a legitimate business
concern to see that such persons are safe while on company property. Id.
3 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
3
4 Id. at 1546.
3 Id.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992
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because the employment-related exposure to radiation created a potential danger to
their unborn children. 6 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
hospital's policy had a disproportionate impact on female employees. The court
engaged in a disparate impact/business necessity analysis in rejecting the hospital's
contention that potential costs of litigation could form the basis of a business
necessity defense.38 The court found that the hospital did not meet its burden of proof
for business necessity for two additional reasons: (1) there was an inconsistency
between the hospital's genuine concern for the fetus and its desire to avoid litigation
costs, which the court found unacceptable; and (2) the hospital failed to consider
acceptable alternatives to job termination for pregnant radiology employees, which
rebutted the defense. 39
In InternationalUnionv. Johnson Controls,Inc.,' the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, in analyzing the employer's fetal protection policy, held that the
business necessity defense can be utilized in fetal protection policy cases and that
Johnson Controls was successful in its presentation of that defense.4' In addition,
the court held that even if BFOQ was also a proper defense, Johnson Controls met
its burden on and succeeded under that defense as well. 42 With this holding, the
a fetal protection policy
Seventh Circuit became the first court of appeals to hold that
43
a
BFOQ.
as
qualify
could
women
at
exclusively
directed
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in InternationalUnion to resolve
the conflicts between the Fourth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and to decide once
and for all whether employers can bar fertile women from jobs that may endanger
their fetuses."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Johnson Controls, Inc., among other things, manufactures batteries.45 The
principal active ingredient in batteries is lead." Lead, arguably, may cause harm to
361d.
"3Id. at 1552.
' Id. at 1552-54. See also Id. at 1553 n. 15.
39
1d. The court allowed the assertion of a business necessity defense only upon a genuine desire to promote
fetal health. The court noted that a business necessity defense could be rebutted by a showing of acceptable
alternatives that would better accomplish the purpose of promoting fetal health or would accomplish the

purpose with less adverse impact on one sex. Id.
o 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
41 Id.

at 887-893. The court further held that the burden of proof as to all three elements of the business
necessity defense was on plaintiffs. Id. That is to say, in order to rebut Johnson Controls' business necessity
defense, the plaintiffs had to establish that: there was not a substantial risk of harm to the fetus; that exposure
to harm was not just through women (or one sex); and that there were adequate but less discriminatory
alternatives.
Id.
42

Id. at 893.
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1202.
44 InternationalUnion, 886 F.2d at 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
43

45Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1199.
46 International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Wis. 1988).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/5
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a fetus in either the conception or post-conception gestation phase of development

or both.47 In 1982, Johnson Controls, Inc. issued a fetal protection policy that
excluded women who were capable of bearing children from jobs that exposed them
to lead. 41
In 1984, plaintiffs, a group comprised predominantly of women who worked

or wanted to work in the lead-exposed jobs, brought a class action suit against their
49
employer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

The plaintiffs challenged Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy as sex discrimination that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.50 The District Court granted defendant; Johnson
Controls, summary judgment. 1 The court utilized a disparate impact/business
necessity analysis in holding that Johnson Controls successfully established a
business necessity defense which plaintiffs failed to rebut because they could not

show an acceptable alternative that would lessen the impact on females. 2

The plaintiffs appealed this decision, and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. 3 The court held that a business
necessity defense applies in fetal protection policy cases and that Johnson Controls

had successfully presented such a defense.'

The court also held that a fetal

55
protection policy directed exclusively at women could qualify as a BFOQ. The

court5 6found that Johnson Controls had successfully maintained this defense as
well.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted review. 57 The Court reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals and held that Johnson Controls' sex specific fetal protection
policy violated Title VII as amended by the PDA. 5 The Court determined that the
47

Tmko, Exploring the Limits ofLegal Duty: A Union'sResponsibilities With Respect to FetalProtection
Policies,23 HLjv. J. oNLEas. 159,164-66 (1986). The effects oflead on fetuses through parental exposure
remains undetermined. The U.S. Supreme Court in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls found it
noteworthy that OSHA investigated the concern about employee exposure to lead and concluded that there
was absolutely no basis for excluding women from lead exposed jobs in order to protect the fetus. Johnson
Controls,111 S. Ct. at 1208 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 52952, 52966 (1978)).
"International Union, 680 F. Supp. at 310. The policy stated: "...[Ilt is [Johnson Controls'] policy that
women who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing children will not be placed into jobs involving lead
exposure or which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job bidding, bumping, transfer or
promotion rights." Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200.
49 InternationalUnion, 680 F. Supp. at 310.
50

Id.

31 Id.

52 Id. at 316-17.
53
InternationalUnion, 886 F.2d at 901.
4 Id.

53Id. at 898.
6 Id. at 901.
InternationalUnion, 886 F.2d at 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
57
58
Johnson Controls, I11 S. Ct. at 1204.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 25 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 5
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:2

policy was facially discriminatory. 59 Accordingly, Johnson Controls had to
establish a BFOQ to make the policy valid. 0 The Court held that the company failed
to establish a BFOQ.I' No justices dissented. Justices White and Scalia wrote
separate concurring opinions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined in Justice White's
concurring opinion. 62 Justice White's opinion maintained that the BFOQ defense
could justify a sex specific fetal protection policy. 63 Justice White contended that
the possibility of tort liability for injuries sustained by children born to female
employees working in a hazardous environment could make it "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation" of a business for an employerto exclude women from
certain jobs.64 Although White stated that a BFOQ defense could justify Johnson
Controls' policy, he concluded that the District Court's grant of summary judgment
in Johnson Controls' favor and the Court of Appeals affirmance of that decision was
improper. 65 White maintained that a dispute over a material issue of fact existed
because the lower courts failed to properly consider evidence of harm to fetuses
caused by lead exposure in male employees.66
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion rested largely on his interpretation of the
PDA. Scalia stated that the evidence presented concerning the debilitating effect of
lead exposure on male employees was irrelevant because the PDA forbids treating
women differently on the basis of pregnancy.67 Scalia apparently agreed with Justice
White's contention that the possibility of substantial tort liability could create a
BFOQ because he stated that Johnson Controls had not demonstrated a substantial
risk of tort liability in this instance.68 In Justice Scalia's view, because Johnson

Controls failed to show a substantial risk of tort liability and because the company
did not establish overburdensome costs arising from the lack of a fetal protection
policy, Johnson Controls did not present a persuasive BFOQ defense. 69 For this
reason, Justice Scalia concurred in the Court's holding.7 0
Thus, while several Justices disagreed with the reasoning of the Court's
deciding opinion, all Justices agreed that Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy
could not be upheld.
5

9Id.
60
Id.
61
1d.
6
2 1d.

at
at
at
at

1203.
1204.
1207.
1210.

63 Id.

64Id.

6 Id. at 1214-16.
66 7 Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1216.
6Id.

69Id. at 1216-17.

70 Id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/5
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ANALYSIS

Before Johnson Controls,1 there was an obvious lack of direction amongst
courts about what to do with fetal protection policy cases.72 Although several73
theories were propounded, courts seemed confused about which standard to apply.
After the Supreme Court's decision, the path that courts should follow is clear. It
is a path leading to gender equality in the employment arena.
A FirmerMethodology

In JohnsonControls, the Supreme Court took a firm position on an issue that
prior courts deciding fetal protection policy cases seemed to skirt-the issue of
policies dealing with women as childbearers being facially discriminatory.74 Johnson
Controls' fetal protection policy prohibited women capable of bearing children from
working in jobs where their blood lead level could rise above 30 micrograms.15 The
policy presumed that women were capable of bearing children until they could prove
otherwise through medical documentation."
Although evidence was presented about the debilitating effect of lead expoon
the male reproductive system, Johnson Controls chose to regulate only its
sure
female employees."' Johnson Controls required only female employees to produce
proof of an inability to bear children. 78 The Court found that these factors indicated
blatant discrimination on the basis of sex. 79 The Court bolstered this conclusion by
looking at the actual wording of Johnson Controls' policy and stating that:
In its use of the words 'capable of bearing
children'.., as the criterion for
exclusion, Johnson Controls explicitly
classifies on the basis of potential
for pregnancy. Under the PDA, such a
classification must be regarded, for
Title VII purposes, in the same light as
explicit sex discrimination8 0
71111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
72 See the various theories under which Title VII cases have been traditionally analyzed and the various
approaches the different jurisdictions have taken with respect to the topic in the BACKGROUND section
of this Casenote.
73I d.
74
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1202-04.
73International Union, 680 F. Supp. at 310. At least one expert opinion indicates that exposure of any

person to lead levels above 12 micrograms is dangerous. Id. at 312. In light of this, Johnson Controls'
designation
of 30 micrograms as a dangerous level seems generous.
76
ld. at 310.
7 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1202.
78
Id. at 1203.
79 Id.
90 Id.
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The policies found in Wright"1 and Hayes8 2 were equally sex specific. Olin
Corporation's policy set up a three-tiered job classification scheme for its female
employees."3 The highest level of this scheme, the "restricted" jobs, required that
women "consult with Olin's medical doctors and confirm that they could not bear
children and would sustain no other adverse physiological effects from the environment" before they could work at such jobs. 4 No such restrictions were placed on
Olin's male employees.8 5
The defendant hospital's policy in Hayes was not a clear statement that was
published, as was the case with the policies of the Olin Corporation and Johnson
Controls, Inc. 6 However, the implications of the Hayes policy were equally sex
specific and discriminatory.8 7 Proof was presented that radiation exposure was
potentially harmful to all x-ray technicians, all x-ray technicians were monitored and
checked on a regular basis, and Ms. Hayes' monthly exposure levels kept her within
the limits defined for potential damage to a fetus. 8 Nevertheless, Ms. Hayes was
terminated when she became pregnant 8 9

Thus, although prior courts were faced with fetal protection policies just as
sexually discriminatory as the one examined in Johnson Controls, it was only the
U.S. Supreme Court that recognized these policies for what they were--obvious
examples of facial discrimination in violation of the amended Title VII. 90
IMPLICATIONS

Setting A High Standard
What makes the Supreme Court's recognition of the policy in Johnson
Controlsas facial discrimination so important is the analysis that must follow such
a finding in future cases.
When an employer has created a facially discriminatory policy, the employer
can only justify this policy if it is based on a BFOQ. 91 This BFOQ defense is a stricter
standard than the business necessity defense, 92 and the Supreme Court when discuss" Wright, 697 F.2d at 1172.
82 Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1543.
83 Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182. For a breakdown of Olin's job classification scheme see note 29, supra.
"Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182.
'5Id.

"Hayes,
726 F.2d at 1551.
87 Id. at 1552.
8"Id. at 1551. The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement set 500 millirems as the
maximum radiation dose a fetus could be exposed to without sustaining damage. Ms. Hayes' levels at their
highest reading showed a total exposure of only 480 millirems for eight months of pregnancy/exposure. Id.
9Id. at 1546.
9°Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203.
91 42

U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) (1988).

'Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss2/5
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ing it in Johnson Controls stated that: "The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and
this Court has read it narrowly." 9 Thus, the decision in Johnson Controlsmakes it
far more difficult for an employer to justify a sex specific employment policy.
Under the BFOQ defense, discrimination would only be permissible where it
is "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation" of the "particular" business.9
In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court decided that sex specific fetal protection
policies could only be justified under the BFOQ defense where a woman's
reproductive capacity actually prevents her from performing the duties of her job.95
The Court further required that an employer "direct its concerns about a woman's
ability to perform jobs safely and efficiently to those aspects of the woman's jobrelated activities that fall within the "essence" or go to the "central mission" of the
employer's "particular" business." 96
By requiring employers with facially discriminatory fetal protection policies
to meet the BFOQ standard, the Supreme Court set a virtually impossible task. To
succeed, an employer would have to show that fetal exposure to a hazardous work
environment prevented the pregnant mother from performing her job.97 It is difficult
to prove that a hazardous work environment causes harm to unbom children. It is
even more difficult to prove that this potential for fetal harm renders fertile female
employees incapable of doing theirjobs. The Supreme Court has set a high standard
indeed.
A StandardRemoved From Reality?
The BFOQ standard, as it is currently being interpreted and applied by the
Supreme Court, is not easily reconciled with the supposed purpose of fetal protection policies. These policies are created with the "ostensibly benign" purpose of
protecting women's unconceived offspring. 98 By requiring employers to establish
a BFOQ to justify these policies, the Court may not be lending enough credence to
the potential for fetal damage.
Under the current BFOQ standard, an employer seeking to justify a fetal
protection policy must show that a female employee's reproductive capacity actually
prevents her from doing her job. 99 In other words, fetal exposure to a hazardous
work environment and the harm that may result therefrom must be shown to render
the pregnant mother incapable of performing her job duties.'0 ° This standard fails
93Id. at 1204.
94 Id.

ld. at 1207.
Id. (quoting its own holdings in Dothard,supra note 23 and Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400 (1985)).
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1207.
"Id. at 1203.

Id. at 1207.
'1 Id.
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to consider the importance of the potential for harm to a fetus.
The BFOQ standard is so narrowly defined and interpreted that it leaves little
to guide employers and employees who are genuinely interested in the protection of
unborn children in making future policy. Presumably, even if a one sex link to fetal
danger was conclusively established, the Supreme Court would still strike down a
sex specific policy simply because the employer could not show that the employee
was rendered incapable of doing his/her job because of the potential harm to the
unborn child.10 1
While the business necessity defense may have been too lenient, its three step
analytical process seemed to consider important aspects of the goal of fetal
protection policies that the BFOQ defense does not.1°2 In Johnson Controls, the
Supreme Court recognized the importance of protecting the unborn stating that, "No
one can disregard that possibility of injury to future children."' 1 3 However, by
failing to modify the BFOQ standard to include at least some consideration of the
potential harm to fetuses from parental exposure to a hazardous work environment,
the Court appears to have done little to formulate a future standard that protects both
the rights of parents and the unbomY04 Perhaps a hybrid standard can be created in
the future when more is known about the potential harm to unborn children from their
parents' exposure to hazardous work environments. For now, the Supreme Court
seems to be more concerned with rectifying a different social ill-discrimination
against women in the workplace.
A Step Down The Path Toward Gender Equality In The Workplace
Historically, concern for a woman's existing or potential children has been the
guise under which employers operate to discriminate against women in the workplace. '0
Fetal protection policies are a classic example of how employers use women's
childbearing capacity against them. These policies do not address the potential harm
posed to fetuses through their father's exposure to a hazardous work environment.
Such policies assume that all employees that can will become pregnant and do not
consider the effects of the continuous use of birth control on women's reproductive
choices.

Further, fetal protection policies appearmostoften in industries where women
'0'The statutory BFOQ defense requires that any sex specific policy whether male or female based be
justified by a showing that the sex of the employee rendered that employee incapable of doing his/her job.

See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(l) and the interpretation of that statute in Dothard,supra note 23 and Criswell,
supra note 96.
02
For a discussion of the three step analysis involved in the business necessity defense see note 41, supra.
103
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206.

10'
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in which the U.S. Supreme Court reconciled the rights of
unborn children with the rights of their mothers when it decided that abortions could only be performed in
the first and second trimesters of pregnancy and not in the third because at that point the fetus could survive
without its mother and had an interest in life that needed state protection.
10' Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1908).
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are performing in traditionally male jobs and not in industries where women are
performing in traditionally female jobs, even though the risks to fetuses are equally
high in both environments.10 This suggests that fetal protection policies are being
used as tools to "weed" women out of male dominated jobs and industries and to
protect or save jobs and job opportunities for men alone. The indication is that these
policies are being used as an excuse for denying women equal employment
opportunities.
The Supreme Court recognized this underlying theme behind fetal protection
policies. At the close of its opinion, the Court made a statement that left its view of
these policies being used against women clear:
It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for the individual
employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more
important... than her economic role. 1 7
With this statement and its decision in Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court
indicated its unwillingness to judicially sanction the use of fetal protection policies
to discriminate against women in the workforce.
Although one cannot predict the future, the impact of the Johnson Controls
decision on modem jurisprudence could be great. Employers truly interested in
protecting their employees' unborn children can no longer rely on under-researched
policies that regulate the work of only one gender. Instead, employers will have to
investigate the possibility of harm to fetuses presented by both sexes and will have
to formulate policies that seek to limit the risks of toxic exposure of all employees
and their unborn children. The Supreme Court has made it clear that blatant sex
discrimination in the workplace will no longer be excused by weak justifications and
scant evidence. Legitimate concerns will have to be backed by legitimate proof.
CONCLUSION
In JohnsonControls,employees challenged the constitutional validity of their
employer's sex specific employment policy and won. The U.S. Supreme Court went
against lower court case law and decided that fetal protection policies could no
longer stand without substantial justification. This decision represents a small step
toward a gender equality in the workplace. However, many more steps are necessary
to reach the utopian goal of a discrimination-free employment market.
A. L. CHERRY
'06 Becker, supra note 10, at 1238. Becker points out that in the electronics industry where the workforce

is predominantly female, women regularly come into contact with toxic substances that are the reason for
fetal protection policies in other industries; yet there are no fetal vulnerability policies in the electronics
industry. Id.
111 S. Ct. at 1210.
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